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Carbon Trading:
Theory and Practice
As governments grapple with an appropriate response to climate change,
we look at the existing carbon trading schemes and the economic arguments
supporting them. In our view, a general approach that combines elements
of pure tax and permits systems would allow governments
to implement an efficient
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CLIMATE CHANGE REPRESENTS a considerable
policy challenge. In its latest report on climate change
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change OPCC)
stated that 'warming of the climate system is unequivocal,
as is now evident from observations of increases in global
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting
of snow and ice, and rising global mean sea level' OPCC,
2007, p. 4). The authors ofthe report also argued that 'most
of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures
since the mid-20th century is very likely [with greater
than 90 per cent probability] due to the observed increase
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations' (p. 8).
Extensive media coverage of climate issues around
the world suggests that governments and the people they
represent are ready for action and yet progress towards
a truly global, efficient and effective response has been
slow. In an attempt to slow down and stabilise the
pace of climate change most countries have signed and
ratified the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1998) to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The Kyoto Protocol is a system based on a 'cap and trade'
approach that sets targets for the reduction of greenhouse
gases (GHG) and facilitates the trading of permits to
emit GHGs between countries and individual entities.
The existence of a trading mechanism allows most GHG
abatement to occur in those sectors of the economy or
in those countries in which it is cheapest. Although the
Kyoto Protocol represents a major step towards a global
policy on greenhouse gas emissions, the protocol has not
been ratified by the world's largest emitter of GHGs: the
United States.
The refusal by the United States and Australia
to ratify the protocol has been viewed by many as an
indication that neither government is serious about
climate issues. However, economic theory suggests that
quantity-based permit systems like the Kyoto Protocol
are the most efficient way to achieve the cap on GHG
emissions only under certain conditions. Conversely, the
theory implies that under a different set of condithrms and
under uncertainty there may be more efficient approaches
to GHG emissions policy. Using these and other economic
arguments the United States and Australia have criticised
the Kyoto Protocol on the following grounds:
• There is a high degree of uncertainty associated with
the nature and consequences of climate change.
• There is a high degree of uncertainty associated with
the relative size of costs and benefits associated with
emission reductions.
• Existing policy proposals fail to adequately account
for these uncertainties.
• Under the current form of the Kyoto Protocol large
developing countries such as China and India need
not cut their GHG emissions in the near future,
which can further damage already fragile competitive
positions of the developed countries.
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Economic theory suggests that
quantity-based permit systems like
the Kyoto Protocol are the most
efficient way to achieve the cap
on GHG emissions only under
certain conditions.
In this paper, we survey some current carbon
emissions trading schemes and markets, briefly consider
the economic theory behind emissions abatement and
discuss an alternative approach to emissions policy. We
begin by providing a brief summary of current carbon
policy and several existing carbon markets.
Current emissions trading schemes
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change has been extensively
debated in both the academic literarure and the public
media. As ofJune 2007, 174 countries and one regional
economic integration organisation (the European
Economic Community) had ratified the Protocol. Australia
and the United States are notable exceptions. The
Protocol is based on a cap and trade system that targers the
quantity ofGHG emissions and promotes trading ofcarbon
allowances between countries and individual entities. In
general, the provisions of the Protocol apply to developed
countries and currently only 35 countries and the EEC are
required to reduce GHG emissions compared with their
historical levels. China and India are excluded.
Under the Protocol, national emission limit setting is
performed by a government agency that decides on a cap
of GHGs that can be emirted consistent with irs Kyoto
target and allocates this quantity, via permits, to major
carbon~emitting industries. Individual organisations may
then choose to either use their carbon allowances to
validate their own GHG production, or to implement new
technologies to reduce their GHG emissions and sell the
permits. Thus, carbon trading occurs between finns that
over~emit and under~emit relative to their allocations;
firms that are able to control their emissions most easily
do so and sell their surplus allowances at a profit to firms
that face higher costs of controlling emissions. The trading
mechanism allows most GHG abatement to occur in those
sectors of the economy in which it is cheapest.
International carbon markets
The international carbon market grew from
US$IO billion in 2005 to US$30 billion in 2006.' Briefly,
carbon trading occurs both within and outside the
framework set up by the Kyoto Protocol through rwo types
of carbon permits. GHG emission allowances are permits
created and distributed under cap and trade regimes such
as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) which operates under the Kyoto Protocol. European
Union Allowances (EUAs) are permits to emit carbon
dioxide issued by regulatory bodies, usually EU state
governments, whose total quantity is fixed under a trading
scheme. Project~based permits, on the other hand, are
emission credits generated from projects that reduce GHG
emissions compared with a no~project scenario. Project~
based permits are derived from two main sources: the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint
Implemenration (JJ) initiative. CDM is an arrangement
within the Kyoto Protocol allowing industrialised
countries with a GHG commitment to invest in emission
reducing projects in developing countries. China, India
and Brazil provided most of the CDM carbon credits
in 2006.2 Although the JI credits are also project-based
credits, they are projects based in industrialised countries.
Japanese buyers participated in about 7 per cent and
European entities in about 86 per cent of the total of all
project~based transactions.3
So far a number of organised international markets
for carbon permits have emerged, with the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme being at the forefront
in terms of its size and regulatory organisation. The other
two notable carbon allowance trading schemes are the
NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS)
and the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) project. We
summarise each of these schemes below.
European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
The EU ETS is the world's largest mandatorycarbon trading
program. Although a relatively new market (launched
on 1 January 2005), it has grown at an unprecedented
rate. The total value4 of transactions conducted in 2006
exceeded US$24 billion, compared with US$8 billion
traded in 2005. The EU ETS was designed to operate
in two phases. During the first phase (2005-07) the EU
ETS covers over 12,000 emitting installations and about
40 per cent of the total EU carbon dioxid~ emissions. The
first phase is a pilot program that will aid the EU in irs
preparation for full compliance with rhe Kyoto Protocol.
The second phase (2008-12) will broaden the coverage of
the EU ETS to more industries as well as greenhouse gases
and will reach compliance with the Kyoto protocol.
European Union Emissions Allowances are
allocated to carbon emitting installations by member
state governments in predetermined quantities through
National Allocation Plans (NAPs). Although the member
states formulate rheir NAPs, they must be approved by
the European Commission. The total number of permits
issued by each member state is constrained to be consistent
with the path undertaken by the EU towards achieving
its overall Kyoto commitment of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions (8 per cent below irs 1990 level by 2012). The
EUAs are legally binding and each affected installation is
required to hold permits in the amount equal to its carbon
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emission. There is a well-developed secondary marker for
EUAs and spor and futures contracts trade on the over-
the..counter market as well as organised exchanges such as
Powernext, European Climate Exchange and Nordpool.
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
CCX is another quantity-based trading scheme. CCX
is a self-regulated exchange that operates on the basis
of voluntary participation where carbon emitting
organisations, institutions or government bodies
voluntarily sign up to its program which then becomes
legally binding. CCX members that sign up to the
abatement scheme are required to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions at a rate of 1 per cent per year relative to
a predetermined benchmark. Those members that reduce
their emissions below the required level are then able to
sell surplus emission allowances on the exchange or bank
them for later use. Exchange members that are unable to
achieve the reduction targets internally can meet their
compliance by purchasing emission allowances through
CCX's electronic trading platform from other CCX
members. Alternatively, they may purchase project-based
offsets. Currently, CCX members include a growing group
of companies, including DuPont, Rolls-Royce, IBM, Ford,
Bayer and numerous local- governments. Although it is a
relatively small market compared to EU ETS and NSW
GGAS, CCX increased the value of traded allowances
tenfold' in 2006 to US$38 million compared to only
US$3 million traded in 2005.
Australian mandatory
environmental trading schemes
The current Australian Government has decided not
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In Australia, the issue of
climate policy has become heavily politicised with the
federal Australian Labor Party publicly criticising the
Liberal Government's refusal to ratify the Protocol
and commit to an emissions target. In January 2004,
a National Emissions Trading Taskforce (NETT) was
set up by the state and territory Labor governments to
develop a National Emissions Trading Scheme (NETS).
In August 2006, the NETT released a discussion paper'
outlining the possible design for a national greenhouse gas
emissions trading scheme. The discussion paper suggested
a cap and trade system to reduce emissions by around
60 per cent compared with 2000 levels by the middle ofthe
century. In February 2007 the Prime Minister established
a separate task group on emissions trading, which argued
that 'market mechanisms, including carbon pricing will
be integral to any long,term response to climate change'
(Howard,]. (PM), 2007). The report, which was released
in May 2007, proposed that a cap and trade model be
adopted with an overall emissions reduction trajectory
which starts moderately and progresses to greater emissions
reductions over time. It has a broader coverage than the
currently proposed design by the NETT including most
sectors other than agriculture. The Prime Minister has
approved the scheme and work has already commenced
on its structure with commencement planned for 2011.
The actual targets and permit allocation details have not
yet been determined, which makes it difficult to assess
in relation to the existing schemes. There is no plan to
scrap the existing schemes, however, it is felt that they
will simply run out over time and as the Federal Scheme
is introduced.
Ir would appear then rhar borh the federal
Liberal Government and the state and territory Labor
governments acknowledge the need for a national
response to climate change based on market mechanisms
and carbon pricing. It is unclear, however, how any
national scheme will be implemenred and coordinated
across the nation and how it will fuse with the existing
schemes that are operating on a state,by,state basis.
Currently Australia has a number of environmental
trading schemes operaring somewhat independently of
each other in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland
and the Australian Capital Territory of which the NSW
greenhouse gas abatement scheme is by far the largest and
most established. Total value of carbon allowance traded
on NSW GGAS increased to US$225 million in 2006'
from US$59 million traded in 2005. The details of these
trading schemes are summarised in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. RENEWABLE ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTALANO CARBON TRAOING SCHEMES
State! Commencement




























The GGAS aims to reduce GHG emissions associated with the production and use
of electricity. It establishes annual state-wide GHG reduction targets, and requires
electricity retailers and certain large users of electricity in NSW to meet the targets
based on their share of the electricity market. Monitoring the performance of
benchmark participants is undertaken by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal of NSW (IPART). The amount of the greenhouse penalty per tonne of
carbon dioxide for any shortfall in certificates surrendered is $11.50 up until 2010,
rising to $12.50 in 2010, $13.50 in 2011. $14.50 in 2012 and $15.50Ior2013 and
subsequent years. Financial instrument traded: GAC = 1MWh.
The target for the NRET is to increase the percentage of renewable energy purchased
to 10% by 2010 and 15% by 2020. NSW Renewable Energy Certificates (NRECsj are
created by the generation of electricity from renewable sources above the baseline.
The decision as to whether this scheme will run in conjunction with the Victorian
Scheme has not yet been determ ined. Shortfall charges and other details are also yet
to be finalised. Financial instrument traded: NREC = 1MWh.
The same aims as NSW GGAS, however, the responsibility forthe operation of the
GAS in the ACT rests with ACT's Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission
and NSW's Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal. Financial instrument traded
GAC·1MWh.
The Victoria renewable energy target aims to increase the percentage of renewable
energy purchased to 10% by2012. The scheme will continue until 2031 and is
predominantly relevant for electricity retailers and large energy users. From 2007 the
penalty for shortfalls is $43/MWh. This will then increase annually in line with the CPI.
Certificates are created by the generation of electricity from renewable sources.
Administered by the Victorian Essential Services Commission. Financial instrument
traded VREC.l MWh.
Aims to encourage more electricity to be sourced from gas with 13% of electricity to
be sourced from gas from 2006 onwards. Penalty for shortfalls per MWh is $11.60
to be increased by the CPI annually. Accredited generators for accredited power
stations may create GECs that may be traded or surrendered to meet their liability.
The Chief Executive of the Department that administers the Electricity Act 1994 is the
Regulator with assistance from The Department of Mines and Energy. Financial
instrument traded: GEC =1MW.
The Scheme requires the generation of 9,500 gigawatt hours of extra renewable
electricity per year by 2010. Renewable energy certificates (RECs) can be created
when solar heaters are installed and renewable energy is produced by small generation
units or power stations. The penalty for shortfalls is $40 per MWh and the scheme is
administered by The Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator who is astatutory
authority established specifically to oversee the Scheme. Financial instrument traded:
REC·1MWh.
A critique of the current state
of the Australian trading schemes
In finance we require markets to be liquid in order for
trading to take place in an efficient manner as this allows
investors to readily sell their securities at the current price
(Hunt and Terry, 2005, p. 479). Thus, liquid markets
form the cornerstone of any belief that the markets are
efficiently pricing the securities being traded. Another
important issue we are concerned with in finance is the
relationship between risk and return - the greater the
level of risk we are ptepared to accept, the higher the
level of return we require in order to be compensated for
that risk.
What risks are associated with the current state
of carbon trading in Australia? As has already been
discussed, the actual consequences of climate change are
highly uncertain. However, for the sake of this analysis,
let us assume the level of risk as useH by Stem in 'The
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change'
presented to the Prime Minister and Chancellor of
Britain in August 2006. Leaving aside the economic risks
of climate change, the dominant risk for those trading
in the carbon markets seems to be the uncertainty and
variability of the steps which the various governments
are taking to combat global warming. Given the wide
disparity in the apptoaches taken in Europe and the
United States, it is unclear if Australia will follow
either one of those schemes, or introduce a completely
different national carbon trading system. This raises the
important questions of if and how the current schemes
will be integrated into the new national program which
the Australian Government plans to introduce no later
than 2012. Until these issues are resolved, firms may
be reluctant to engage in carbon trades or invest in
carbon financial instruments in Australia for fear that
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FIGURE 1. CLIMATE POLICY UNDER
THE ASSUMPTION OF CERTAINTY
Leaving aside the economic risks
of climate change, the dominant
risk for those trading in the carbon
markets seems to be the uncertainty
and variability of the steps which
the various governments are taking
to combat global warming.
abatement and this poses an important additional cost to
society from emissions policy, namely the risks associated
with incorrectly estimating costs and benefits and thus
implementing an inappropriate level of policy.
Greenhouse gases are a 'stock' pollutant - it is the
build-up of carbon dioxide (and other GHGs) in the
atmosphere over long periods of time that matters for the
climate. It is unclear if the reduction of GHG in the short
run will result in substantial changes in benefits at the
margin. On the other hand, the effects ofcosts to consumers
and producers of changes in the abatement effort are likely·
to be relatively significant as they involve shifting to more
expensive technologies. Under these conditions, a tax or
price~based system is more efficient because differences
between expected and realised costs and benefits are less
damaging to welfare if the policy sets the tax (the price
of emissions) and allows the quantity of abatement to be
market driven rather than setting the quantity (the number
of permits) and allowing the price to adjust (McKibbin
and Wilcoxen, 2002). In the context of carbon markets,
the damage to society created by an inappropriate tax
level, with the resulting amount of abatement being either
more than or less than optimal, will be smaller than the
damage of setting an inappropriate level of abatement and
having to bear unexpectedly large costs. This argument,
based on a seminal paper by Weitzman (1974) is presented
The economics of climate policy
The greenhouse gas emissions policies discussed above
are permit or quantity~based systems. Tradeable permit
systems are an attractive mechanism for climate policy
because they allocate emissions to their most valuable use
and encourage long~term investments that are critical to
the reduction of emissions. Importantly, permit systems
can act to strengthen the policy itself because they
encourage support from the owners of valuable permits.
In the case of GHG emissions, however, economic theory
suggests that quantity-based instruments are likely to be
inefficient when compared with price instruments.
If the costs and benefits of emissions abatement were
perfectly known, then intervention could take the form
of a price (tax) or a quantity (permit) instrument with
either policy approach capable of achieving an efficient
level of emissions abatement - the amount of reduction
in emissions at which the marginal benefit of abatement
(lower environmental damage) equals the marginal cost of
abatement (higher costs ofproduction). There is, however,
a great deal of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of
their carbon allowances written under one of the several
existing programs may become worthless once the new
national scheme is established.
With tespect to liquidity, Australia's relatively
small population compared with Europe raises liquidity
issues which are exacerbated by the increasing number of
different schemes and markets currently under operation.
The NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme Registry
shows 17,857,364 NSW GGACs were traded in 2006,
however, this was in only 669 trades. This is improving
with 9,571,902 GGACs traded in 592 trades in the first
four months of 2007. Johnson, Winter and Slattery note
that there were only 42 trades in the Queensland Scheme
for the year until October 2006. In contrast, Europe
has seen a recent rationalisation in their marketplace
commencing with the amalgamation of the European
Climate Exchange and Powemext Carbon to become the
largest futures and spot market exchange (Morrison).
Another component aiding liquidity in Europe is the
availability of cash and derivative carbon contracts traded
through organised exchanges. Suchstandardisedconrracts,
in terms of size and maturity, provide the opportunity for
market participants to trade and hedge their positions
with relative ease and with low transaction costs. Equally
as important, lower transaction costs found on organised
exchanges allow trading by speculators who provide
liquidity and improve price discovery. In Australia) carbon
trading is implemented in the over-the-counter (OTC)
markets which are less transparent than their European
and American counterparts and, as a result, more difficult
to assess in terms of market efficiency and efficacy. We
believe it is likely that the Australian carbon markets
would benefit from the inrroduction of a standardised
carbon instrument. However, at this point in time, there is
an even greater need for a single set of ovetriding national
regulations, targets, rules and penalties.
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Despite the efficiency argument,
tax-based systems are unlikely to be
politically popular. Significant levels
of taxation may be required in order
for there to be any significant effect
on emissions levels.
by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002, p. 65) using a simple
diagram (see Figure 1).
In Figure I, the Me curve represents marginal
abatement costs and the MB curve represents the marginal
benefits of emissions abatement. As described above, the
MB curve is drawn relarively flat compared with the MC
curve because we hypothesise that the marginal benefit of
GHG abatements is smaller than its marginal cost. The
efficient level of abatement exists where marginal benefits
equal marginal costs. If the nature of the MB and MC
curves were known with certainty, this could be achieved
by either a tax on emissions at the rate Pe or a permit
policy where the quantity of required reduction would be
Qe per cent of the total amount of emissions. However,
the nature of these curves is highly uncertain.
Suppose, for example, that marginal costs are believed
to be lower than those depicted in Figure 1 and that the
Me and MB curves are (incorrectly) assumed to intersect
at point a. Under a permit system, the quantity of permits
(Qp;100 - Q,) would be less than rhe efficient level, the
difference given by Q, - Q, and firms would be forced to
undertake the additional abatement. The price of a permit
would rise to PI and the cost of the additional abatement
would exceed the benefits by the shaded area P. Under
a tax system, the same intersection point a would result
in a tax level set at Pz but firms would soon realise the
higher than expected marginal cost curve and would, in
response, reduce their level of abatement to Qz. This level
of abatement is too low but the welfare loss associated
with the tax system (shaded area T) is much smaller than
the welfare loss associated with the permit system.
It is important to understand that the relative slopes
of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves are crucial
to this argument. While the nature of stock pollutants
suggests that the marginal benefit curve will be relatively
flat compared with the marginal cost curve (Newell and
Pizer, 2003), the properties of these curves are highly
uncertain. Despite the efficiency argument, tax~based
systems are unlikely to be politically popular. Significant
levels of taxation may be required in order for there to
be any significant effect on emissions levels. This would
be difficult to 'sell' politically as it would disadvantage
consumers and energy intensive producers.
In the case of GHG emissions, both pure approaches
are unlikely to be politically sustainable. The pure permit
system requires the achievement of rigid targets regardless
of the cost of doing so (the high degree of uncertainty
associated with climate change requires governments to
commit to targets that are associated with unknown and
possibly excessive costs). Whereas permit systems create
vested interests in the continuation of climate policy,
pure tax systems create vested interests in its removal.
One way to overcome the problems associated with the
pure permit and tax-based approaches to climate policy
is a hybrid approach that combines the best elements
of both mechanisms and avoids most, if not all, of the
shortcomings. Hybrid approaches to emissions policy are
now receiving considerable attention in the academic
literature (see, for example, Newell and Pizer, 2003;
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2006).
A hybrid approach
For over a decade, economists Warwick McKibbin
and Peter Wilcoxen have been promoting their hybrid
approach to emissions policy - the McKibbin-Wilcoxen
Blueprint. It is only recently that they have managed
to generate serious interest from governments and key
private sector players.
Under the McKibbin-Wilcoxen Blueprint (see
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2006), the government supplies
short~term permits at a fixed price which act like a 'tax'
on emissions, but also issues (to those deserving of welfare
compensation) a government~determined amount of
valuable long~term· or perpetual emission permits. The
valuable perpetual permits (that 'could be traded among
firms, or bought and retired by environmental groups' (p.
7») provide long-term credibility by creating 'a private
sector constituency with a clear financial interest in the
seeing the policy maintained and enforced' (p. 7). The
annual permits provide the advantages of an emissions
tax: 'they provide clear financial incentives for emissions
reductions but do not require governments to agree to
achieving any particular emissions target regardless of
cost' (p. 8). Other key aspects of the proposal are detailed
in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002, 2006). While the
Blueprinr has a potential of achieving GHG abatement
at lower costs than the more rigid price~only or quantity~
only policies, under uncertainty, it should be noted that
the EU has very large interests vested in its existing multi~
billion dollar EU ETS system.
Conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol continues to receive both public
and political support, but economic theory suggests that
under certain conditions and uncertainty, permit systems
may be a relatively inefficient approach to policy. An
alternative hybrid approach to emissions policy is now
being widely debated. Although global warming is an
issue that requires a coordinated international response,
the process of international agreement is complex and
countries should be encouraged to undertake meaningful
steps to reduce emissions now, even in the absence of an
effective international agreement.
8 .JASSA THE FINSIA JOURNAL OF APPLIED FINANCE ISSUE 3 2007
References
Acuiti Legal 2003, Overview of the NSW Greenhouse Gas
Abatement Scheme; Prepared for Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal, Sydney, www.acuiti.com.au
AHem Arthur Robinson 2004, Victoria to Introduce A Renewable
Energy Target, Melbourne, www.aar.COffi.au
Australian Government 2004, Securing Australia's Energy Future,
www.greenhouse.gov.au/markets/mret/
Australian Emissions Trading Forum, 2007, Review Emissions
Trading for Australia, www.aetf.net.au
Carr, M. & Kishan, S. 2006, Europe Fails Kyoto Standards as Trading
Scheme Helps Polluters, Bloomberg.com, www.Bloomberg.com
Department ofEnergy, Utilities and $ustainability, NSW
Government 2006, N$W Renewable Energy Target Explanatory
Paper, www.greenhouse.nsw.gov.au/actions/agencies/dec/nsw_
renewable_energy_targecnret
Department ofMines and Energy, Queensland Government 2006,
13% Gas Scheme, http://www.energy.qld.gov.au/13per centgas.cfm
Howard,]. (PM) 2007, Weekly Radio Message - Climate Change, 5
February available at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2007/
Speech23887.cfm
Hunt, B. & Terry, C. 2005, Financial Institutions and Markets, 4th
Edition, Thomson Nelson Australia Pty Ltd.
IPCC 2007, Climate Change 2007, The Physical Science Basis,
Summary for Policymakers, Contribution ofWorking Group I to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change.
James, T. & Fusaro, P. 2006, Energy & Emissions Markets Collision or
Convergence?, Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pty Ltd., Singapore.
Department ofEnergy, Utilities and Sustainability 2006, NSW
Renewable Energy Target Explanatory Paper, www.deus.nsw.gov.
au/Publications/NRET
Johnson, Winter & Slattery Lawyers 2006, Mandatory Environmental
Trading Schemes Anticipated to be Operating in Australia in 2007,
wwwJws.com.au
Kruger, J. & Pizer, W. 2004, 'The EU Emissions Trading Directive;
Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls', Discussion Paper, Resources for
the Future, Washington D.C.
McKibbin, W.]. & Wilcoxen, P.J. 2002, Climate Change after
Kyoto: BlueprintJor a Realistic Approach, The Brookings Institution,
Washington.
McKibbin, W. J. & Wilcoxen, PJ. 2006, 'A Credible Foundation for
Long Term International Cooperation on Climate Change', Lowy
Institute for International Policy Working Papers in International
Economics, no. 1.06.
Morrison, K. 2005, 'Rationalisation Swiftly Follows Creation',
Financial Times, http://www.mgminter.com/pdfs/newsI20050706_
FTN31_32.pdf
National Emissions Trading Taskforce 2006. Possible Design for a
National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, August, www.
emissionstrading.net.au
New South Wales Government 2006, Introduction to the Greenhouse
Gas Abatement Scheme, www.greehousegas.nsw.gov.au
Newell, R.G. & Pizer, W.A. 2003, 'Regulating stock externalities
under uncertainty', Journal oj Environmental Economics and Management,
45, pp, 416-432,
NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme Registry 2007, Trade
Statistics, http://www.ggas-registry.nsw.gov.au/searching/
tradestatistics.aspx
Queensland Government, Department ofMines and Energy 2007,
13% Gas Scheme, www.energy.qld.gov.au/13per centgas~cfm
Parkinson, M., 2007, 'Emissions trading for Australia: Leader or
Laggard? Public Panel Discussion', ANU Institute for Environment
Stern. H. 2006, The Stern Review on the Economics ofClimate
Change, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independencreviews/stern_
review_economics_c1imate_change/stern_review_report.cfm
Switkowski, Z. 2006, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear
Energy Review, Speech to the National Press Club, 21 November~
The World Bank 2007, State and State and Trends of the Carbon
Market 2007, http://carbonfinance.org/docs/Carbon_Trends_2007-
_FINAL_-_May_2.pdf
Weitzman, M.L. 1978, 'Optimal Rewards for economic regulation',
The American Economic Review, vol. 68 no. 4, pp. 683-691.
Notes





6. http://www.emissionstrading.net.au/key_documents I discusion_paper
7. The World Bank, op. cit.
JASSA THE FINSIA JOURNAL OF APPLIED FINANCE ISSUE 3 2007 9
ohnsla
